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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In April of 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached
a settlement agreement with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police
(PBP) to correct a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct.' It was
the first time the DOJ had used 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to intervene
into a local police department to correct systemic misconduct.2
The statute, passed in response to the Rodney King beating,
provides the U.S. Attorney General with the power to seek
equitable relief against troubled local police departments. 3
As the reform process began to unfold in Pittsburgh, "problems
soon emerged."4  The consent decree required Pittsburgh to
improve its process for investigating and responding to civilian
complaints.5 But at times, the PBP found it difficult to comply
with this requirement, in part because the city had agreed to a
collective bargaining agreement with the police union that limited
which complaints were eligible for investigation.6  While the
consent decree established ambitious goals for improvement, it
also included a clause that read: "Nothing in this Decree is
intended to alter the collective bargaining agreement between the
City and the Fraternal Order of Police."7 This meant that, in
attempting to reform the Pittsburgh Police Department via
§ 14141, the DOJ was effectively limited in its reach because of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. As Jonathan M.
Smith, the former Chief of the Special Litigation Section of the
DOJ's Civil Rights Division has observed, the Pittsburgh
1 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, PN-PA-003-002 (W.D. Penn. Apr.
16, 1997) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Consent Decree].
2 Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, app.
B (2014) (showing that Pittsburgh was the first department to reach an agreement with the
DOJ).
3 See infra Part II.
4 Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments From DOJ
Reforms, IN THESE TIMES (June 21, 2016), http://inthesetimes.com/features/police-killings-
union-contracts.html.
6 Id.
6 Id. (describing how the union contract at that point limited investigations of complaints
about conduct that happened over ninety days before the filing of the complaint).
7 Pittsburgh Consent Decree, supra note 1, at 4.
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experience is hardly unique.8 In the over twenty years since the
DOJ has had the power under § 14141 to seek equitable relief
against police departments, it has often had to take on "less
sufficient reform strategies" because of the barrier of police union
contracts.9
This Essay explores this phenomenon in more depth. It shows
how state labor law can complicate the implementation of police
reform efforts by the DOJ via 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Over the last
twenty years, the DOJ has used § 14141 to investigate over sixty
police departments and to reform over thirty.10  This reform
process often attempts to overhaul internal department policies
related to the investigation and oversight of police officers.
Internal disciplinary policies, though, are frequently the product of
collective bargaining.
Most states permit or require localities to bargain collectively
with police unions about the terms of internal disciplinary
procedures." Previous research has shown that a significant
number of police union contracts include potentially problematic
disciplinary procedures that shield officers from accountability and
oversight.12  This means that the very policies that federal
intervention via § 14141 is designed to reform-internal
departmental disciplinary policies-are commonly the product of
state labor law. As this Essay shows, this creates a challenging
situation for the DOJ as it attempts to implement top-down
reforms in a local police department. On one hand, undoing the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement can reduce
organizational acceptance of federal intervention. On the other
hand, failure to alter these policies can hamper reform efforts.
Ultimately, the goal of this Essay is narrow. It seeks to
diagnose, rather than remedy, this tension in the federal oversight
of local police departments.
8 Emmanuel, supra note 4 (pointing to a similar problem in other DOJ settlements with
police departments in Newark, Albuquerque, Seattle, Portland, U.S. Virgin Islands, and Los
Angeles).
9 Id.
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part III.
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II. FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Traditionally, the federal government has played a minimal
role in regulating local police misconduct. 13 Around the mid-
twentieth century, the federal government began to take a more
serious interest in overseeing local police departments. 14 Federal
courts enacted the exclusionary rule, which prevents the state
from using certain evidence obtained by police officers in violation
of the Constitution.15 And courts opened up avenues for private
litigants to more easily file civil suits against police officers and
their employers. 16 But despite these gradual steps, until the late
twentieth century the federal government remained a mere
"backstop" in the fight against local police misconduct.1 7
That changed in the early 1990s after the Rodney King incident
motivated Congress to reevaluate its approach to police
oversight.18  In 1994, Congress eventually passed 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141 as part of the omnibus crime bill known as the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.1 9 This measure gave the
U.S. Attorney General the authority to seek equitable relief
against local and state police departments engaged in a "pattern or
13 STEPHEN RUSHIN, FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN AMERICAN POLICE DEPARTMENTS 9-13
(2017) (describing this as the "Hands-off Era" of federal police regulation; explaining how,
during this hands-off era, the federal government viewed police misconduct as a largely
local issue).
14 Id. at 13-19 (describing this era as the "Intervention Era" and explaining how the
federal government began to slowly increase its oversight of local policing in the mid-
twentieth century).
15 See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to
states and localities, and not just misbehavior by federal law enforcement).
16 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (establishing that a private litigant could sue
a police officer for misconduct under certain situations); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694-701 (1978) (holding that a claimant under § 1983 could recover from a police
department based on the actions of an officer if the department was deliberately indifferent
in failing to train or supervise the officer).
17 Police Brutality: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Civil and Coast. Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 3 (1991) (statement of John R. Dunne, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Civil Rights Div.).
1s DARRELL L. Ross, CIVIL LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183-85 (6th ed. 2013)
(identifying the Rodney King incident as a turning point in the eventual passage of § 14141).
19 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) ("It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority ... to
engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers . .. that deprives
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution. . . .").
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practice" of unconstitutional misconduct.20 For the first time, this
measure "pushed the federal government onto the front lines." 2 1
Section 14141 represented, in part, a congressional recognition
that private litigants and the DOJ both previously lacked standing
in most cases to seek equitable relief against police departments
engaged in unconstitutional misconduct.22 While enforcement of
the statute has varied by political administration, 23 the DOJ has
since used the measure to investigate over sixty agencies and
intervene into over thirty.24 In fact, the DOJ has targeted some of
the largest cities in the country with this mechanism, including
Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, Newark,
New Orleans, New York, Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Washington,
D.C. 2 5 It is safe to say that § 14141 has become one of the "most
important legal initiatives of the last twenty years in the sphere of
police regulation." 26
The best available evidence suggests that § 14141 reforms are
effective at combatting patterns of misconduct. Independent
studies in numerous cities have found that the DOJ has effectively
used the statute to reduce officer uses of force, reduce civil liability
for police misconduct, increase citizen satisfaction, and increase
apparent compliance with legal norms.27
20 Id.
21 RUSHIN, supra note 13, at 16.
22 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 110 (1983) (holding that a private
litigant who had been victim of a dangerous chokehold did not have standing to enjoin the
Los Angeles Police Department from using such a tactic since he could not prove that he
would be harmed by the chokehold again in the future); United States v. City of
Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that, absent congressional
authorization, the DOJ also lacked the necessary standing to seek equitable relief against a
local police department).
23 See, e.g., Rushin, supra note 2, at 3228-34 (showing how enforcement dipped during the
second half of the George W. Bush administration, before ticking back up during the Barack
Obama administration; attributing this change in enforcement to shifts in internal policies).
24 For a fairly updated list of all police departments subject to DOJ investigation and
intervention under § 14141, see Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102
CORNELL L. REV. 721, app. at 777-79 (2017) (showing in a complete list of all such agencies
from 1994 to 2016).
2 Id.; see also RUSHIN, supra note 13, at app. 286-91 (showing a complete list of § 14141
cases).
26 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 798 (2006).
27 Joshua M. Chanin, Negotiated Justice? The Legal, Administrative, and Policy
Implications of "Pattern or Practice" Police Misconduct Reform (July 6, 2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, American University), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/237957.
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Despite this success, DOJ action under § 14141 has not always
proceeded smoothly. Critics have raised concerns about the cost of
§ 14141 reform, 28 the time table for reform efforts, 29 the potentially
anti-democratic nature of federal intervention,3 0 the possibility of
de-policing, 31 the need for organizational buy-in,32 and questions
pdf (showing how reform efforts in Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, Prince George's County
Maryland, and Cincinnati all appeared to lead to improvements); CHRISTOPHER STONE,
TODD FOGLESONG & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT
DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/
pdflHarvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf (walking through various empirical measures like
pedestrian stops, traffic stops, use of force, survey data, and participant observation in
concluding that the LAPD has made substantial progress during its DOJ oversight period);
ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, CAN FEDERAL
INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE PITTSBURGH
CONSENT DECREE (2005), http://www.calea.org/content/calea-2010-annual-report (relying on
surveys, focus groups, interviews, monitor reports, and other statistics in finding that
Pittsburgh made measurable progress during federal oversight); Joshua Chanin,
Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct
Reform, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67 (2016) (drawing on use of force data, citizen complaint
data, and civil suit data to suggest that § 14141 reforms appear to have a meaningful
effect); Stephen Rushin, Competing Case Studies of Structural Reform Litigation in
American Police Departments, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 113, 136 (2016) (showing how the
LAPD made significant progress under federal oversight, while the DOJ failed to bring
about reform in Alamance County, North Carolina).
28 Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1408-10 (2015) (describing how the high cost of police reforms via
§ 14141 may prove highly problematic for poorer municipalities); Richard Rainey, Mitch
Landrieu Requests a Doubling of Tax Rates for New Orleans Police and Fire, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (May 1, 2014), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/05/mitch_1andrieus-t
axhike.plan.html (describing how New Orleans had to consider a significant tax hike in
order to afford the cost of structural reform litigation in its police department).
29 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1392 (showing in Figure 5 that this reform process can take
anywhere from five to around twelve years to complete).
3 For example, now Attorney General Jeff Sessions previously authored a position paper
in which he described consent decrees as undemocratic: "One of the most dangerous, and
rarely discussed, exercises of raw power is the issuance of expansive court decrees. Consent
decrees have a profound effect on our legal system as they constitute an end run around the
democratic process." Michael E. DeBow, Gary J. Palmer & John J. Park, Jr., Consent
Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation: Strategies for State Legislatures, ALABAMA
POLICY INSTITUTE 1 (2008), http://www.alabamapolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/API-Researc
h-Consent-Decrees.pdf (forward by Jeff Sessions).
31 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 24 at 764-67 (using a difference-in-difference
estimation strategy to show that the introduction of federal oversight is correlated with an
apparent uptick in crime rates relative to unaffected municipalities); see also Rushin, supra
note 28, at 1412-14 (describing this critique of structural reform litigation).
32 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1416-18 (citing the Alamance County, North Carolina
example as a location where the DOJ was unable to stimulate change in a police
department, in part because of a lack of local support for the reform measures).
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about sustainability. 33 Others have also worried that the current
§ 14141 process does not adequately consider community
viewpoints in crafting policy reforms. 34
Only recently, though, have scholars begun to recognize the
complex relationship between state labor laws and § 14141 reform
efforts. 35 The existing literature has -found that police unions
object to federal reform efforts under § 14141 for several reasons.
For one thing, officer unions sometimes view new disciplinary
procedures as unnecessarily onerous and time-consuming for
officers. 36  Additionally, officer unions have argued that the
§ 14141 reform process fails to adequately consider their feedback.
While the DOJ will often listen to police union demands in
constructing the terms of consent decrees under § 14141, the DOJ
almost always negotiates these agreements behind closed doors
with municipal leaders. 37
Union resistance to DOJ reform efforts is not particularly
surprising. Researchers have previously documented a number of
different situations where police unions have opposed internal
reform efforts, including internal policy changes, the installation of
civilian review boards, and changes to internal disciplinary
33 Id. at 1410-11 (citing Pittsburgh as an example of a location where federal
intervention helped bring about reforms, only to see some patterns of misconduct reemerge
after the federal government ended oversight); Jeffrey Benzing, Pittsburgh Police Could
Face Second Federal Consent Decree, Peduto Says, PUBLIcSOURCE (July 1, 2014), http://
publicsource.org/from-the-source/pittsburgh-police-could-face-second-federal-consent-decree-
peduto-says (describing how Pittsburgh saw misconduct return after federal intervention
ended, which could inspire another federal consent decree).
4 Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for "Community
Engagement" Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016)
(encouraging the DOJ to incorporate the views of more stakeholders in police consent
decrees); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the "New Paradigm" of Police
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010)
(similarly arguing for more community input in police reforms).
3 Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 799 (2012)
(arguing that labor and employment protections could act as a "tax" on police reform
efforts); Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2179,
2205-17 (2014) (mentioning the effect of labor laws and collective bargaining on policing).
3 Chanin, supra note 27, at 185 (describing how the union in Washington, D.C. objected
to the paperwork required by the federal consent decree).
3 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1376 (describing how the DOJ prefers to negotiate directly
with municipal leaders without involving police union groups); United States v. City of Los
Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2001) (order denying the Los Angeles
Protective League's motion to intervene).
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procedures. 38 This sort of resistance "is understandable" since
policies implemented as part of the § 14141 reform process "may
affect the day-to-day work of frontline officers," and an "organized
labor unit designed to enhance working conditions for its members
should rationally want to block such changes-or at minimum be a
party to any negotiations." 39
What is missing from the existing literature, though, is a richer
account of how state labor law interacts with the federal police
reform process under § 14141. Emerging evidence suggests that
police unions, the collective bargaining process, and state labor
law generally, may have a more significant effect on the § 14141
reform process than scholars have previously observed. As
discussed in the next Part, new research shows that police unions
have been able to use the collective bargaining process and the
legislative process to obtain unreasonably proactive internal
disciplinary procedures in many large American police
departments. These problematic internal disciplinary procedures
can facilitate systemic misconduct within a police department.
This means that state labor laws may contribute to the very
problem the DOJ seeks to remedy via § 14141.
Thus, when the DOJ seeks to eradicate a pattern or practice of
misconduct within a police department, state labor law may pose
an obstacle. The DOJ has been reluctant, thus far, to use the
§ 14141 process to upend these labor protections afforded by state
law-possibly because of a concern that such an action could
reduce organizational buy-in. Ultimately, it appears that state
labor laws are more intimately linked to the success (or failure) of
§ 14141 interventions than scholars have previously recognized.
The next Part discusses the existing and emerging literature on
the relationship between state labor laws, internal disciplinary
procedures, and patterns of misconduct in American police
departments.
38 COLLEEN KADLECK & LAWRENCE F. TRAvIS, III, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICE
DEPARTMENT AND POLICE OFFICER ASSOCIATION LEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY
POLICING: DESCRIBING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF AGREEMENT 3-4 (2004), https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226315.pdf (describing several examples of union resistance to
reform efforts).
39 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1376.
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III. STATE LABOR LAWS AND INTERNAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
Until recently, legal scholars have spent little time
investigating the ways that collective bargaining shapes the
content of internal disciplinary procedures in American police
departments. Most scholarship on police reform has focused
primarily on how external legal mechanisms-like the
exclusionary rule and civil litigation-can create an incentive
structure that will lead rational police supervisors to implement
reforms.
Recently, though, a number of scholars have problematized this
traditional narrative. Even with the presence of external reform
pressures, municipal leaders sometime have ulterior motives for
acquiescing to police union demands for lax disciplinary
procedures. Police unions are powerful political constituencies,
capable of swinging local elections with their endorsement (or lack
thereof).40 Collective bargaining sessions typically happen behind
closed doors and with minimal community input.4 1  Given the
political pressures and the lack of transparency, there have been
documented cases of municipal leaders offering significant
concessions in disciplinary procedures when communities are
unable to meet union demands for increased compensation. 42
Recent research has begun to shed light on how frequently
collective bargaining agreements result in the establishment of
problematic internal disciplinary procedures. 4 3 At least one study
40 Jonathan M. Smith, Police Unions Must Not Block Reform, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/opinion/police-unions-must-not-block-reform.html
(describing the "political clout" of police unions in local elections).
41 See PRIYA M. ABRAHAM, OPENING THE CURTAIN ON GOVERNMENT UNIONS 5-8 (2015),
http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/docLib/20150609_CBTransparency.pdf (showing
that most states provide limited transparency into collective bargaining negotiations).
42 John Chase & David Heinzmann, Cops Traded Away Pay for Protection in Police
Contracts, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2016, 8:36 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/b
reaking/ct-chicago-police-contracts-fop-20160520-story.html (providing details on how the
City of Chicago gave the police union lax disciplinary standards when they were unable to
provide higher salaries or more benefits).
43 For example, L. Song Richardson and Catherine Fisk have hypothesized on the
complex relationship between police union contracts and internal disciplinary procedures.
Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (2017).
Outside of the legal academy, a group of activists associated with Campaign Zero have done
important work compiling and analyzing union contracts from eighty-one large American
cities, demonstrating that many of the contracts contain potentially problematic clauses
that impair accountability. Based on their work, the group has made several
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1209
has found that around eighty-eight percent of union contracts in
municipal police departments serving communities with at least
100,000 residents contained at least some questionable provisions
that could shield officers from accountability.44 Many contracts
delay interviews after suspected misconduct,45 provide officers
with evidence before interviews, 4 6 mandate the destruction of
disciplinary records,4 7 ban civilian oversight, 4 8 prevent anonymous
recommendations for improving union contracts. DeRay McKesson, Samuel Sinyangwe,
Johnetta Elzie & Brittany Packnett, Police Union Contracts and Police Bill of Rights
Analysis, CAMPAIGN ZERO (June 29, 2016), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be
4b08efl97467542/t/5773f695f7eOabbdfe28alfO/1467217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Uni
on+Contract+Report.pdf.
4 Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1224 (2017) (coding and
analyzing the content of 178 police union contracts, describing the law surrounding
collective bargaining in American police departments, and ultimately making normative
recommendations on how to improve the collective bargaining process so as to avoid
regulatory capture).
6 For example, the City of Minneapolis mandates a two-day waiting period before
investigators can interview officers about alleged misconduct. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS,
LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AND THE POLICE OFFICERS'
FEDERATION OF MINNEAPOLIS 4 (2012) (on file with author). For other examples, see, e.g.,
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF
ALBUQUERQUE AND ALBUQUERQUE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 32 (2014) (on file with
author) (permitting officers to have two hours to consult with a lawyer before making
statements); MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND MUNICIPALITY
OF ANCHORAGE 8 (2015) (on file with author) (guaranteeing officers at least twenty-four
hours of notice before any noncriminal misconduct interview).
46 Rushin, supra note 44, at 1227 (stating that "A ... significant ... number of
municipalities . .. mandate that supervisors provide frontline officers with copies of all
evidence of wrongdoing against them hours or even days in advance of interrogations.").
47 See, e.g., CITY OF BALTIMORE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE BALTIMORE CITY LODGE NO. 3, FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE, INC. UNIT I, at 24 (2015) (on file with author) (agreeing to remove
allegations of misconduct from employees' files after three years, if the complaint was found
to be unsustained or unfounded, or if the employee was otherwise found not guilty); CITY OF
CINCINNATI, LABOR AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN QUEEN CITY LODGE NO. 69 FRATERNAL
ORDER OF POLICE AND THE CITY OF CINCINNATI 41-42 (2014) (on file with author)
(permitting retention of disciplinary records that resulted in fewer than thirty days of
punishment for no more than three years, while allowing their retention for up to five years
if the act resulted in thirty days or more of punishment); CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF JACKSONVILLE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
POLICE OFFICERS THROUGH SERGEANTS 41 (2011) (on file with author) (establishing five-
year time frame for deleting records, depending on the severity of the punishment).
48 See, e.g., CITY OF ST. LOUIS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF ST. LouiS AND THE ST.
Louis POLICE OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION/FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE 68, at 19-20
(2014) (on file with author) (establishing a commission devoid of citizen participation that
makes all final determinations for disciplinary action); CITY OF BALTIMORE, supra note 47,
1218
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civilian complaints, 49 indemnify officers in the event of civil suits,50
and limit the length of internal investigations.5 1 This is not to say
that these terms are always irrational. It is understandable that
police officers want reasonable procedural protection when faced
with internal investigations that threaten their professional
livelihood. Nevertheless, the frequency and scope of these
potentially problematic limitations on internal disciplinary action
suggests that some supervisors may find it unreasonably difficult
to investigate, oversee, or punish an officer engaged in misconduct.
To be clear, no scholarship has definitively found that collective
bargaining causes the development of overly protective internal
disciplinary procedures. It could be that even without collective
bargaining, politically powerful police groups would use the
political process to obtain similarly generous internal disciplinary
procedures. In fact, emerging research shows that police unions
have been able to obtain unreasonably protective procedures via
the normal legislative process, too. In at least sixteen states,
police officer groups have successfully secured the passage of so-
called Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of Rights, which codify
protective internal disciplinary procedures for frontline officers.
Nevertheless, most police officers are part of police unions. 52 And
courts and state labor boards frequently interpret collective
bargaining statutes to require the bargaining of internal
at 20, 22 ("Any employee suspended from duty with pay shall be given a suspension hearing
as soon as reasonable following the suspension from duty, wherein a determination will be
made at that time whether or not the employee shall remain suspended with or without pay
and/or be placed on administrative duties.... No civilians other than an Administrative
Law Judge may serve on a Departmental Hearing Board.").
4 Rushin, supra note 44, at 1235 ('Thirty-two contracts [in one study of 178 contracts]
limit management's authority to investigate anonymous civilian complaints.").
r See, e.g., CITY OF ANN ARBOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CITY OF ANN ARBOR AND ANN ARBOR POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION FOR POLICE SERVICE
SPECIALISTS 51 (2013) (on file with author) ("[T]he Employer will indemnify and defend
employees in connection with liability claims arising out of the performance of the
employee's police duties.").
51 See, e.g., CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, supra note 45, at 33 (limiting internal investigations
to only ninety days in length); CITY OF CLEVELAND, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE CITY OF CLEVELAND AND CLEVELAND POLICE PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION
NON-CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 10-11 (2013) (on file with the author) (similarly providing a six
month limitation).
52 BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13
(2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf (showing that around two-thirds of officers
are employed by departments that engage in collective bargaining).
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disciplinary procedures. 53 Thus, in practice, internal disciplinary
procedures generally flow from the collective bargaining process.
This has a couple of important consequences. First, it is not
always easy for local political leaders to change internal
disciplinary procedures in a police department. Given that
collective bargaining statutes normally permit or require the
negotiation of disciplinary procedures, this means that even a
dedicated political leader who wanted to bring about reform must
wait until it is time to negotiate a new police union contract.
Second, it may be costly for political leaders to tackle questionable
language in a police union contract. By taking such a position
during bargaining sessions, political leaders are likely to face
demands by police officer unions for additional compensation or
benefits to offset the changes.
All of this suggests that bringing about constitutional reform in
police departments may require not just changes in leadership and
enhanced training,54 but also a renegotiation of internal
disciplinary procedures via the collective bargaining process.
Labor law may also complicate § 14141 reforms in other ways that
scholars have not yet fully considered. As the next Part explains,
this realization has important implications for federal reforms via
§ 14141.
IV. How STATE LABOR LAW COMPLICATES FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Section 14141 has emerged as a powerful weapon in the federal
government's arsenal for combatting misconduct in American
police departments. Even so, it appears that internal disciplinary
procedures, often established through collective bargaining
agreements, contribute to the inability of some police departments
to control misconduct within their own ranks. This creates a
5 See, e.g., Union Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No.
112, 766 N.E.2d 1027, 1031-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that discipline was a
mandatory subject of bargaining); City of Casselberry v. Orange Cty. Police Benevolent
Ass'n, 482 So. 2d 336, 340 (Fla. 1986) (holding that municipalities are still required to
bargain collectively on some internal disciplinary procedures); City of Reno v. Reno Police
Protective Ass'n, 653 P.2d 156, 158 (Nev. 1982) (holding that Nevada law requires
municipalities to negotiate with police departments over disciplinary measures).
5 Both of these are reforms common during § 14141 cases. See Rushin, supra note 28, at
1384, 1400.
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fundamental tension. On one hand, attempts by the DOJ to undo
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement would upset
frontline officers, thereby reducing organizational acceptance of
federal intervention. On the other hand, failure to alter these
policies can hamper reform efforts. The first two subparts below
describe how the terms of internal disciplinary procedures can
frustrate § 14141 reform efforts. The third subpart considers the
drawback of using § 14141 reform as a mechanism for overhauling
internal disciplinary procedures established via the collective
bargaining process.
A. INVESTIGATION OF PATTERNS OR PRACTICES OF MISCONDUCT
One way that labor law can complicate federal intervention is
by hampering DOJ investigations. Remember, collective
bargaining agreements frequently limit the ability of police
supervisors to keep records on officer behavior.55 In fact, one
recent empirical evaluation found that nearly half of police union
contracts mandate the destruction of disciplinary records over
time.56 This means that, even if an individual officer is engaged in
systemic misconduct over many years, it may be difficult for
supervisors to uncover such a pattern.
Such a limitation on departmental recordkeeping can prove
particularly problematic when the DOJ attempts to investigate a
police department suspected of violating § 14141. The federal
government only has authority to seek equitable relief against a
police department under the statute if it can show the agency is
engaged in a "pattern or practice" of unlawful misconduct. Single
acts of misconduct, no matter how egregious, are insufficient to
demonstrate such a pattern. Instead, the DOJ must generally
show a history of misconduct within the agency that rises to the
level of a "pattern or practice."
55 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing how police union contracts often
require the destruction of personnel records after a set period of time).
56 Rushin, supra note 44, at 1230-31 ("In total, eighty-seven of the cities studied have
language in their collective bargaining agreements that requires the removal of personnel
records at some point in the future.").
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Once the DOJ has selected a police department for federal
intervention under § 14141,57 it begins a formal investigation. In
doing so, the DOJ "takes an 'inventory of departmental policies
and procedures related to training, discipline, routine police
activities, and uses of force, and conducts in-depth interviews to
determine whether the department's practices adhere to formal
policies."5 8 The DOJ also "look[s] into and review[s] investigations,
both citizen complaints and use of force investigations."59 This
sort of an investigation of departmental records works most
effectively when the department maintains adequate records on
officer behavior, disciplinary investigations, and use of force
incidents.
Ironically, departments that fail to properly document
disciplinary histories may both be the agencies most likely to be
engaged in a "pattern or practice" of misconduct, and the agencies
where the DOJ may face the biggest methodological challenges in
persuasively demonstrating a statistical pattern of misconduct.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENTS AND CONSENT DECREES
Another way that labor law can complicate federal intervention
efforts is by slowing down reform efforts. In Albuquerque, Los
Angeles, Newark, Pittsburgh, Portland, Seattle, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, collective bargaining provisions "appear to have
weakened or stalled efforts to improve the handling of police
misconduct, to create or extend civilian oversight, or to establish
early-warning systems for problem cops." 6 0
The case of Portland, Oregon is particularly instructive. The
collective bargaining agreement in Portland provides officers with
up to a forty-eight-hour waiting period before they can be
questioned about potential misconduct. 61 It also requires advance
57 For a complete account of how the DOJ targets an agency for preliminary inquiry and
formal investigation under § 14141, see Rushin, supra note 2, at 3219-26.
8 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1371 (quoting INT'L AsS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PROTECTING
CIVIL RIGHTS: A LEADERSHIP GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 8
(2006), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e06064100.pdf).
59 Rushin, supra note 2, at 3227 (quoting an interview participant describing this formal
investigation process).
6 Emmanuel, supra note 4.
61 CITY OF PORTLAND, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PORTLAND POLICE ASSOCIATION
AND THE CITY OF PORTLAND 36 (2013) (on file with author).
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notice of the location, date, and time of the alleged incident, as
well as the complainant's name and the nature of the allegation. 62
In its 2012 findings letter, the DOJ found the Portland police
officers to be engaged in a pattern of excessive or unnecessary use
of force, particularly against people "with actual or perceived
mental illness."6 3 Eventually the DOJ and Portland agreed to a
consent decree that established new regulations for the oversight
of officer use of force.64  While the consent decree included
language requiring the City of Portland to ensure that all uses of
force were "properly investigated, reviewed, evaluated, and, if
necessary, remedied,"65 and it required the city to train officers in
de-escalation, 66 it did not address the waiting period provided by
the collective bargaining agreement.
This failure proved problematic in the eyes of the external
monitors assigned to oversee the Portland Police Bureau. In their
Fourth Quarterly Report, filed in January of 2016, the monitors
argued that "by agreeing to a contract that requires" a delay before
interrogating officers suspected of misconduct, "the City requires
the Bureau to forfeit the opportunity to obtain pure
contemporaneous statements from the involved officers about what
each did and why they did it."67 This is not to say that the DOJ and
the City of Portland have been unable to implement substantial and
necessary reforms. The collective bargaining agreement only
establishes a handful of relatively narrow limitations on the DOJ's
abilities to reform the Portland Police Bureau.
But the limitations on reform that the collective bargaining
agreement does establish are important. The events in Chicago
62 Id.
63 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice & Amanda
Marshall, U.S. Att'y for the Dist. of Or., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Sam Adams, Mayor, City of
Portland 10 (Sept. 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/egacy/2012/09/1
7/ppb findings_9-12-12.pdf.
6 Consent Decree at 16-28, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3:12-cv-02265-SI (D.
Or. Dec. 17, 2012).
65 Id. at 16.
66 Id. at 17 ("Officers shall use disengagement and de-escalation techniques when,
possible. . . .").
67 MICHAEL GENNACO, ILANA ROSENZWEIG & JULIE RuHLIN, OIR GROUP, REPORT TO THE
CITY OF PORTLAND ON PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS AND IN-
CUSTODY DEATHS, FOURTH REPORT 115 (Jan. 2016), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ipr/art
icle/561174.
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are demonstrative of how these sorts of interrogation waiting
periods can limit officer accountability. After Officer Jason Van
Dyke fatally shot and killed seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald
in October of 2014, Van Dyke and six other officers filed police
reports that falsely claimed that McDonald had charged the
officers with a knife.68 How was it that so many different officers
wrote separate reports providing a nearly identical-and
demonstrably false-version of events? Chicago, like Portland, has
language in its collective bargaining agreement that provides
officers with between two and forty-eight hour waiting periods
before being subject to interrogations. 6 9 This provides officers with
the time to coordinate stories after potential misconduct incidents
in a way that deflects blame. As the DOJ argued in their
investigative report on the Chicago Police Department, this
problem is not merely "theoretical."70 There are documented cases
where body-worn cameras have caught officers coordinating stories
only moments after a shooting occurred.71 In Chicago, the DOJ
ultimately recommended the removal of these waiting periods
after officer involved shootings from future collective bargaining
agreements.72
C. THE NEED FOR ORGANIZATIONAL BUY-IN
So what should the federal government do when faced with a
collective bargaining agreement that impairs their ability to bring
about necessary reform via § 14141? Given the obstacles that
68 Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically From Video, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5,
2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-laquan-mcdonald-chicago-police-reports-met-20
151204-story.html (explaining how video evidence ultimately proved that these officers had
provided false accounts).
6 CITy OF CHICAGO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF
POLICE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CHICAGO LODGE NO. 7, at 6 (June 2, 2012)
(on file with author) ("The interview shall be postponed for a reasonable time, but in no case
more than forty-eight (48) hours from the time the Officer is informed of the request for an
interview and the general subject matter thereof and his or her counsel or representative
can be present.").
7o UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS Div. AND UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S
OFFICE FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 57
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www. justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download.
71 Id. at 57-58.
72 Id. at 58-59 (calling for the renegotiation of these waiting periods and stating that "the
CBA-imposed 24-hour rule should be eliminated").
1224 [Vol. 51:1209
2017] STATE LABOR LAW AND FEDERAL POLICE REFORM1225
certain police union contracts may pose for § 14141 reform efforts,
some may wonder-why doesn't the DOJ simply challenge the
terms of collective bargaining agreements as contributing to a
pattern of unconstitutional misconduct? Why is it that, generally,
the DOJ has been reluctant to try and immediately reform the
police union contract?
The answer to this question is at the heart of the complex
relationship between state labor law and federal police reform. In
order to be successful, federal officials need frontline officers to
buy in to the reform process.73  If frontline officers remain
resistant to new oversight and disciplinary measures, the reform
process may be long and slow. A recent empirical study suggests
that, even as currently enforced, § 14141 may cause some officers
to engage in less aggressive policing.74
There, researchers found that the introduction of federal
intervention appeared to contribute to a periodic, but statistically
significant uptick in certain crime rates relative to unaffected
municipalities. 75 The authors of that study concluded that this
effect was consistent with claims made by police unions that
federal intervention came with growing pains, as officers had to
adjust to new external policies. 76 The study did not find that
constitutionally sound policing policies are inconsistent with
effective crime fighting; quite the contrary, in fact.77 After a few
years, there was no evidence to suggest that cities targeted for
federal intervention were any less effective at fighting crime than
the average American city.78 Rather, the authors of the study
argue that officers may take time to fully buy-in to the reform
process. This is consistent with survey data from a number of
cities targeted for § 14141 reforms. 79
73 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1416-18 (describing the need for local support in order for
§ 14141 reforms to be successful).
74 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 24, at 735.
75 Id. at 758.
6 Id. at 759.
77 Id. at 772.
78 Id. at 730.
79 See, e.g., ROBERT C. DAVIS, NICOLE J. HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER W. ORTIZ, CAN
FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE PITSBURGH
CONSENT DECREE, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 21 (2005), https://www.vera.org/ publications/can-f
ederal-intervention-bring-lasting-improvement-in-local-policing-the-pittsburgh-consent-decree
(showing how frontline officers complained that accountability "increased to the point that
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All of this suggests that unilaterally forcing major revisions to
the collective bargaining agreement-a document designed
through collaboration-on an unwilling police union may prove
unreasonably disruptive and hamper the overall reform process.
In many ways, the approach by the DOJ during the Obama
Administration made sense. It did not shy away from calling out
potentially problematic language in collective bargaining
agreements.80 Nevertheless, it did not seek to use the federal
courts to overturn these collective bargaining agreements.
Instead, it pressured municipalities to renegotiate these
problematic terms when the collective bargaining agreements
expired. This seems to strike a reasonable balance. It implicitly
recognizes that overhauling a police department via § 14141 is a
marathon. It can often take over ten years for the DOJ to release
a police department from federal oversight.81 Given the lengthy
timetable, the DOJ may be wise to prioritize, at least initially,
policy and procedural reforms that do not directly overturn
collective bargaining provisions-and focus later in the process on
altering the collective bargaining agreement through a more
collaborative process. This may ensure organizational buy-in by
stakeholders involved in the reform process.82
V. CONCLUSION
With the election of Donald J. Trump as the forty-fifth
president of the United States, and the elevation of former
Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions to U.S. Attorney General, there is
reason to believe that § 14141 cases may be less common in the
officers are almost afraid to say anything in fear of punishment"); CHRISTOPHER STONE, TODD
FOGLESONG & CHRISTINE M. COLE, POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 19 (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-
LAPD%20Study.pdf (describing how seventy percent of officers agreed with the statement
that "paper work deters officers from making arrests," and even more-seventy-nine percent-
believed that as a result, external regulation impeded the LAPD's ability to fight crime).
8 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing DOJ criticism of certain portions
of the Chicago collective bargaining agreement).
81 Rushin, supra note 28, at 1392 (showing in Figure 5 that structural reform litigation in
American police departments can take between five and twelve years to complete).
82 See Patel, supra note 34, at 416 (arguing for the inclusion of more stakeholders in the
development of DOJ consent decrees); Simmons, supra note 34, at 408-09 (similarly
advocating for a more collaborative and inclusive process).
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coming years. 83  Neither Trump nor Sessions has shown a
penchant for federal intervention into the affairs of local police
departments in the name of civil rights. Thus, it may be that the
issues identified in this Essay are, for all practical purposes, moot
until the election of a new president.
But absent the repeal of § 14141, it seems likely that future
administrations will again rely on this measure as a major tool for
improving America's most troubled police agencies. When that
day comes again, it is important to recognize the complex
relationship between federal police reform and state labor law.
Collective bargaining agreements often frame the content of
internal disciplinary procedures in American police departments.
Emerging evidence suggests that a significant number of these
collective bargaining agreements in large American cities include
language that unreasonably protects frontline officers from
accountability and oversight. Thus, when the DOJ elects to use its
authority under § 14141 to reform a police department's internal
policies and procedures, it will almost invariably face a few
challenges in the local collective bargaining agreement.
This raises a larger normative question: what should the DOJ
do in such cases? When enforcing § 14141, how should the DOJ
respond to terms in collective bargaining agreements that
frustrate reform efforts? Ultimately, the narrow focus of this
Essay fails to reach these broader normative concerns. Future
research might examine how courts and litigants dealt with
similar problems in other institutional contexts, like schools or
prisons. In any event, this Essay should be the beginning of a
broader discussion about the relationship between state labor law
and federal police reform efforts.
83 DeBow, Palmer & Park, supra note 30, at 1-2 (describing a statement by then-Senator
Jeff Sessions criticizing federal intervention into local police departments).
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